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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENID ALLEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. 15415 
vs. 
GREYHOUND LINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff/appellant, herein referred to as "plaintiff", 
filed an action in the District Court of Weber County, to 
recover damages for a personal injury sustained while a passenger 
in a Greyhound bus which collided with another vehicle. 
The accident occurred on the 27th day of January, 1974, 
afterthe plaintiff boarded a bus in Ogden, Utah, destined to 
Dillon, Montana. The bus became involved in a collision in 
Pocatello, Idaho. 
The action was commenced on the 2nd day of June, 1976, 
in excess of two years after the accident occurred. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment immed-
iately after the lawsuit was commenced upon the grounds that the 
accident occurred in Idaho, and since Idaho had a two-year 
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statute of limitations and the acti'on t was no corrunenced unt_ 
more than two years after the accident, the action was the:,-
barred. Judge Calvin Gould denied the motion and the case', 
set for trial. After the entire case was tried, Judge Ron;:: 
Hyde took the matter under advisement and subsequently rulec 
that the plaintiff was a resident and citizen of the State, 
Montana and since the accident occurred in Idaho and the act. 
was not commenced for more than two years after the acciden'. 
occurred, the plaintiff had no cause of action against the 
defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court'sdeci: 
and instructions to the trial court to award the plaintiff d::• 
in accordance with the evidence produced at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 27th day of January, 1974, the plaintiff ir.·1 
action, Mrs. Enid Allen, boarded a bus in Ogden, Utah, destir 
to Dillon, Montana. When the bus .reached Pocatello, Idaho,: 
driver left the Interstate Highway, descended the off-ramp ir. 
the town of Pocatello, headed to the Greyhound Bus Terminal: 
unload passengers. In the process of so doing, the bus ran'.· 
the rear end of a snowplow owned and operated by the State c' 
Idaho, that was involved in plowing snow from the highways. 
mater ial here, and:' factors surrounding the accident are not 
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only pertinent issues relate to the residency-citizenship of 
the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff in this action, Mrs. Enid Allen, is a 
62 year old lady who, together with her husband, presently operate 
a Royal Inn Motel located in Dillon, Montana. They acquired less 
than a one-third interest in said motel in August, 1972. (T-3) 
When they entered into the arrangements for the purchase 
of the motel the plaintiff and her husband agreed that they would 
assume the management responsibilities at least on a limited 
basis. 
By way of background on Mrs. Allen, she was born in Utah, 
went to school in Logan, and attended for some time in Preston, 
Idaho. She went to high school in Logan, Utah, and she and her 
husband were married in Logan, Utah. 
In 1954 Mrs. Allen and her husband purchased a home in 
Ogden, Utah, and lived there continuously until their move to 
Montana in 1972. 
Mrs. Allen was a registered voter in Ogden, Utah, and 
voted in Ogden in 1962, 1964 and 1968, and although she moved to 
Montana in 1972, she·voted in the 1972 Utah election by absentee 
ballot. In 1974 she and her husband voted in the Utah election 
by coming down here to do so. (T-6) She did, however, vote in 
the presidential election in Montana in the year 1976, in November, 
after this action had been commenced in June. (T-7) 
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When Mrs. Allen and her husband t wen to Montan; . 
expected to live there for two, three or four yea b 
rs, ut ·· 
expected that they were "definitely coming back to Ogder.: 
retire or to live at home". (T-62) 
At the time Mrs. Allen left her home in Ogden, ,. 
left all of her household goods including beds, tables, c:.'. 
and other household furniture, none of which were removed: 
Montana. She allowed her daughter to live in the home wi'.: 
the payment of rent to take care of the home for the plair.:. 
and whenever Mrs. Allen or her husband came back to Ogden, . 
stayed in the home. (T-4) 
In addition to the property at 793 Cross Street, 
plaintiff owned another parcel of property located at 615 '.: 
Street, which they rented out. 
When the plaintiff went to Montana to live in tf:'· 
she lived in the motel building itself, which had an apart:-
for the manager. (T 8-9) 
Other pertinent facts that appear in the testimc; .. 
trial are: 
1. The plaintiff, who filed a joint return·;. 
her husband I paid income taxes in Montana for the years rr: 
1973, 1974 and 1975. (T 60-61) 
2. The automobile that the plaintiff and her 
husband owned was licensed in the State of Montana. 
(T-611 
3. The plaintiff went to the Mormon church i: 
. d her tit'I 
Dillon, Montana, went to Relief Society there, pai 
') 
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there and her church records were transferred to Montana. (T-58) 
4. Mrs. Allen has never applied for or ever 
acquired a Montana driver's license, and she has continued to use 
her Utah driver's license from the time she left in 1972. Her 
present license is not scheduled to expire until 1980. (T-5). 
5. Mrs. Allen has continuously voted in the State 
of Utah elections, including November, 1974, at which time she 
and her husband journeyed from Montana to vote here. She never 
voted in Montana until the presidential elections in 1976, (T-7) 
which of course occurred after the injury and after she had filed 
her action in June. 
6. Mrs. Allen continued to secure personal services 
such as dental care, services of doctors, etc., in Utah through-
out the period of time she operated the motel in Montana, and in 
fact the very purpose of her visit to Ogden at the time the 
accident occurred was to secure dental care. (T-9) 
7. Plaintiff continued to own her two pieces of 
real property in Ogden, Utah, a~d whenever Mrs. Allen or her 
husband were in Ogden they stayed there. (T-4) 
8. Mrs. Allen testified consistently through the 
trial that it was never her intent to remain indefinitely in 
Montana and it was always her intent to return, where she said, 
"I had no intentions of living anywhere but in our home here in 
Ogden". (T-7) 
9. At the time Mrs. Allen saw Dr. Swindler, the 
independent medical examiner selected by the insurance carrier, 
.. 
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she wrote on the doctor's personal history 
record that she_ 
at the Royal Inn in Dillon, Montana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT TO THE PLA!ii: 
THE BENEFITS OF TITLE 78 -12-45 UCA 1953. 
It is clear that Mrs. Allen was either a citizeno' 
State of Utah or a citizen of the State of Montana at the ti:. 
cause of action accrued. It is equally clear that the cause. 
action arose in the State of Idaho, which has a two year sta: 
of limitations. The action was not filed in the Utah courts! 
after two years had elapsed. 
Notwithstanding, the plaintiff believes that Title, 
45 UCA was specifically designed for her benefit in this pn: 
kind of situation. Said statute provides, 
When a cause of action has arisen in another 
state or territory, or in a foreign country, and 
by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there· 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse 
time, an action thereon shall not be maintained agd 
him in this stci.te, except in favor of one who h~ 
a citizen of this state and who has held the ca~ 
action from the time it accrued. (emphasis added) 
The obvious reason for this kind of statute is to 
to be travel ing on or ove:l protect a Utah citizen who happens 
· f h t It 1" s presumed that we all know: territory o anot er sta e. 
Very Often this is not tr. law of the state in which we live. 
. t is abund because of the complex nature of our system, but 1 
know,. 
clear that we do not and are probably not expected the · 
Wh ich we pass when·;. law of every state through \vhich or over 
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use a public conveyance, i.e., bus, train or airplane, or even a 
private automobile. The statute therefore merely gives to a 
Utah citizen the right to use our own statute of limitations, 
presumably a period of time known to him, if he can otherwise 
bring the action in the State of Utah. It therefore appears that 
the statute os remedial in nature, designed specifically for 
persons in the same position as the plaintiff here, and ought to 
be liberally construed in favor of said plaintiff. 
The trial court obviously equated residency with citizen-
ship when the Court said in his Conclusions of Law, "Plaintiff was 
at the time of her injury, and presently is, a resident and citizen 
of the State of Montana". 
Unfortunately we cannot find within the Utah law suffic-
iently precise definitions for "resident" or "citizen", or language 
that distinguishes between the two. However, it appears to the 
plaintiff that the term, "citizen" refers to the relation of 
allegiance and protection, identification with the state, and a 
participation in its functions. The Utah Constitution from the 
preamble through Article III, refe:i::s to "men", or "persons", or 
"the people" defining in broad terms their rights, etc. When we 
reach Article IV, however, "Elections and Rights of Suffrage", 
the Constitution for the first time speaks of "citizens", 
obviously making a distinction between ''men", or "persons" and 
"citizens". So it logically follows that all men or all persons 
living in the state and able to take advantage of certain 
constitutional rights within the state are not citizens. Article 
IV, Section 1 provides, 
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The rights of citizens of the State f 
vote and hold office shall not be 0 Utah' denied or abri~­
on account of sex. Both male and female 't· ' 
of this state shall enjoy all civil ci lZens 
religious rights and privileges. ' political anc 
Although plaintiff can find no specific cas d' 
es ist: 
uishing between residents and citizens, we think the a· t' is inc. 
is obvious. It relates to certain privileges, such as votin: 
are not held by all persons who simply live within the state 
we believe the term, "citizenship" carries with it the 
cannot: 
of affection, allegiance, or other endearing feelings. 
If the legislature intended Title 78-12-45 U~~~ 
to residents or persons of domicile within the state, they cc. 
easily have done so, but they chose instead the word "citize:. 
In this connotation, a person may reside in one stc" 
and be a citizen of another. 
It further appears that the Utah Court disfavors ap:. 
ation of a short statute of limitations which would deny the 
court jurisdiction when an action in another form would grant 
jurisdiction based upon a longer statute. This was the case· 
Juab County Department of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah :I 
426 P.2d 1, where the court said at page 3, 
If the transaction be in· doubt as to whether o: 
. t d by a statute. under a written contract or one crea e ,· 
this state generally the one giving the longest1;, 
of limitatlon is to be preferred ... Accordinglyther 
t d as to sus .. action should ordinarily be so cons rue .. tto 
the complaint if the allegations are suffici~\ not· 
state a good cause of action in a contr~ct, h/ ·uris· 
tort, or vice versa; and so as to sustain. t Jf the 
· · d · t1on o diction if the court would have Juris ic 5 : 
· h ther· and so a action in one form but not in t e. 0 • '. s if the 
avoid the bar of the statute of limitation. t~0 
action would be barred in one form but not in 
(emphasis added) 
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In the case now before the court it is clear that under 
the Utah Statute of Limitations, Mrs. Allen would have had four 
years from the date of the accident to file her claim. 
It is equally clear that Mrs. Allen could and did file 
her action in the State of Utah and secured jurisdiction of the 
defendant here. This was not challenged by the defendant presum-
ably because she purchased her ticket or entered into a contract 
with the bus company in Utah to transport her to Dillon, Montana, 
and further, because the bus company was doing business in the 
State of Utah. 
Therefore, standing alone, she would have had a four 
year statute of limitations in the State of Utah. 
It should be remembered that Mrs. Allen boarded the bus 
in Ogden and traveled to Pocatello, Idaho, enroute to Dillon, 
Montana, where her injury occurred. This s.ituation occurs many 
times involving public conveyances, and several of the states have 
been forced to deal with statutes of limitations either as to time 
in which an action may be prosecuted or statutes that limit 
recovery. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526 
(New York 1961), the court declined to enforce the Massachusetts 
statute which limited recovery in the event of death even though 
the accident causing the death occurred in Massachusetts. The 
court said, 
Modern conditions make it unjust and anamalous to 
subject the traveling citizen of this State to t~e 
varying laws of other States through and over which 
they rnove ... Our courts should if possible.provide. 
protection for our own State's people against unfair 
and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which 
.. 
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result from these disasters ... For our court t 
1 . . d h. s o be 
. imite by t is damage ceiling (at least as t 
d · · l' · ) · o our own om1c1 iaries is so completely contrary t 
bl · · h o our pu ic policy t at we should refuse to apply that 
part of the Massachusetts law. 
That reasoning is certainly applicable here. Why: 
a citizen of Utah or a citizen of Montana, if the tri'al court 
ruling was correct, be subjected to a shorter statute of l~ 
ation, i.e. the Idaho statute, by virtue of the fact that the. 
injury occurred in Idaho while traveling on a public conveyan: 
The effect is to penalize travelers who are unwary of restric: 
statutes in the state through which they travel. 
This is further reason why plaintiff believes that: 
legislature intended to protect a "citizen of Utah" as iliey~ 
in foreign states by allowing them to use the Utah Statute of 
Limitations providing the other factors enumerated in the stat 
were present. 
The plaintiff in this action could also have filed t, 
action in the State of Montana, which has a statute of limitaL 
at least equal to that in Utah, assuming she could secure juri:-
diction over the defendant there. It appears that she had a 
choice of where to bring the action but she claimed Utah to be: 
state of her citizenship, the state of her residency, she rew· 
her medical treatment here, this was the location of her homei 
d · g trear her personal belongings, and in the process of un ergoin 
this was a more convenient and comfortable place to be. 
It is not now a question whether Mrs. Allen could 
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recover against the defendant, but whether she should have 
commenced her action in the State of Montana. Obviously, if 
the action were filed there, the defendant could have raised 
the identical questions, i.e., her residency and jurisdiction. 
The defendant can claim no injury by virtue of the fact that the 
action was commenced in Utah rather than Montana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
INTENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN A CHANGE OF RESIDENCY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has apparently equated the terms 
"domicil" with "residency" in Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 
222 P.2d 1055 (1950). In the Gardner case an action was brought 
to secure a divorce in the State of Utah and the requirement of 
a bona fide residency for three months immediately before the 
commencement of the action was drawn into question. In the 
Gardner case, the husband and wife who were having some difficulties 
but attempting to reconcile their differences, purchased a home 
in the State of California and began remodeling. When the couple 
was unable to reconcile their differences, the wife filed for 
divorce in the State of Utah. The husband defended upon the 
grounds that she was not a resident and therefore the courts had 
no jurisdiction. 
The court found that 
A floating intention to return to a former abode 
is not sufficient to prevent the new abode from 
becoming one's domicil. 
Notwithstanding, the court said at page 1057, 
.. 
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However, it is also true that a contingent · . 
t h ' d . . intent . 
o c an
1
gef one s omici~ accompanied by a temporar:· 
rem~va r~m d an. e7tablished domicil will not wort1 
a c ange oTh omicil '. at least until the continge~c' 
occurs. e essential fact that raises a cha ·. 
c:ibode ~o a chai;ge of domicil is the absence 0~~ 
intention to live elsewhere. (emphasis added) __.;, 
The court in Gardner apparently found the testimon: 
of the wife that it was her "expressed intention not to abanc 
the home in Logan, Utah, as a domicil until she could detenni;. 
whether the attempted adjustment away from relatives and frier.: 
would be successful" was the controlling factor, that is, h~ 
intentions were paramount provided there was sufficient evide; 
bearing on the question of intent. Plaintiff believes that tc 
a logical and the best approach to the issue of residency. 
Unfortunately the Utah Code is somewhat deficient ir. 
defining "resident" except in the Elections Statute, i.e. Titl: 
20, which established a somewhat detailed criteria for deterrni: 
ing residency at least for election purposes. Title 20-2-141i 
UCA, provides, 
For purposes of this subsection the 'place of 
residence' of any person sh9-ll be determined by the 
following rules as far as they are applicable: 
(a) That place must be considered and he~d t? 
be the residence of a person in which his habitation 
is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has 
the intention of returning. 
. d d to have los: (d) A person shall not be consi ere , 
his residence who leaves his home to go to a. forehign 
· t · thrn t e 
country or to another state or precin~ wi intentic:. 
state for temporary purposes merely with.the h 
of returning· provided, he has not exercised~r 
, ' . f h th r state o 
right to elective franchise o sue o e ~
precinct. (emphasis added) 
(e) A person must not be considered to have 5 h. h he come 
gained a residence in any count)[ to w ic intention 
merely for temporary purposes without the 
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of making such county his home. 
(f) If a person removes to another state with 
the intention of making it his principal place of 
business, he loses his residence in this state. 
(emphasis added) 
(g) If a person removes to another state with 
the intention of remaining there for an indefinite 
time as a place of permanent residence, he loses his 
residence in this state notwithstanding he entertains 
an intention of returning at some future period. 
(emphasis added) 
(i) A change of residence can only be made by 
the act of removal joined with the intent to remain 
in another place. There can only be one residence. 
A residenc~ cannot be lost until another is gained. 
(emphasis added) 
Admittedly some of the foregoing, and particularly 
subparagraph (f) is damaging to the claim of the plaintiff. 
However, (f) is inconsistent with (g) and (i), because the 
plaintiff did not move to Montana to make it a place of "permanent 
residence" as provided in subparagraph (g). She always intended 
to return. And the evidence that the court should look to as 
they did in Gardner v. Gardner includes the fact that, 
(1) she maintained her home in Ogden, continued to 
pay the taxes, maintained all of the household goods and furni-
ture therein, and when she was in Utah she lived in the residence 
and did not lease it out but had another member of her family 
occupy the residence; 
(2) she continued to vote in Utah. She even 
physically came to the State of Utah in the 1974 elections to 
vote here. And although the court made mention in his Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that she voted in Montana in the 
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"last election" he was referring to the 1976 · presidential 
election which occurred after the accident, after the lawsui: 
had been filed, and the court had assumed jurisdiction of tr,, 
case. (The court may even have believed that she voted in 
Montana prior to the commencement of her action and that ma" 
have been a factor in his decision.) In any event, she did: 
vote in the Montana presidential election until November, 19" 
several months after her action had been filed in the Utah c:. 
The court is aware that 1976 was a presidential election and 
voting requirements in presidential elections had been liber 
ized nationally prior to that election. 
(3) She continued to use her Utah driver's lice· 
never having applied for another one in Montana; 
( 4) she continued to come to Utah for professi:· 
services. 
Admittedly, as the defendant argued at trial, the 
plaintiff and her husband filed a joint tax return in Montana 
They went to church in Montana. They paid their tithing in 
Montana and they licensed their automobile in Montana, but aL 
of these things upon which defendant relies are things that:· 
was obligated to do, not by choice, but because of staWU· 
had no choice whether to register a vehicle in Montana· She· 
· h taxes 1' n Montana if the money was eac no choice whet er to pay 
there. She had no choice whether to license their business i: 
Montana, and obviously if she went to church in Montana that'' 
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where the church records would be physically p,resent. But on 
all those factors over which she had a complete and free and 
independent choice, i.e., where she votes, what kind of driver's 
license she carries, where she seeks professional services and 
where she owns a residence to which she can return at will and 
live there, enjoying her household goods, appliances and personal 
belongings, etc., are all in Utah. 
Paramount in the criteria set by the legislature to 
determine residency, is the question of intent. There is no 
evidence whatever in the record that Mrs. Allen ever intended to 
become a resident or citizen of the State of Montana. In fact, 
the evidence is precisely the opposite. All of the indicia 
relied upon by the defendant to show intent, relate to matters 
over which she had no choice. 
provides, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
PERSONS WITH LEGAL CAPACITY TO CHANGE THEIR DOMICIL 
MAY DO SO IF THEY CAN BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AND IF 
THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. 
The RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, Section 15, (1970) 
A domicil of choice may be acquired by a person 
who is legally capable of changing his domicil. In 
addition to legal capacity, acquisition of a 
domicil of choice requires, (a) physical presence 
as described in Section 16, and (b) an attitude of 
mind as described in Section 18. 
The fact of physical presence at the particu~ar 
place must concur with the existence of the required 
attitude of mind. If there is such concurrence, and 
the requisite legal capacity, a change of dornicil 
takes place. (emphasis added) 
.. 
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The restatement continues, Section 15, Comment (a): 
... This attitude of mind takes the for~ f 
. . "' o a present intention to make a home in the place. 
0
, 
provides, 
order of occurrence of these events is not m t '.' 
. f a en i they all eventually coexist a change of a .~ 
• • 
/ om1c· is accomplished. Important evidence looking t · 
the establishment of the third requirement is ~~ar 
fact that. the person has abandoned his former ao!i· 
or otherwise can be shown no longer to bear tow : 
that place the requisite attitude of mind. (em;~:, 
added) ~ 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, Section 18 (19Ji 
To acquire a domicil of choice in a place, a 
person must intend to make that place his home for 
the time at least. 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, Section 18 (1911 
Comment (a), states, 
states, 
The most important factor in identifying the 
proper state is to be found in the third requiremer.: 
for the acquisition of a domicil of choice, namely 
intention or attitude of mind. (emphasis added) 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS I Section 20 (191( 
When a person with capacity to acquire a ~omici: 
of choice has more than one dwelling place, his 
domicil is in the earlier dwelling place unless the 
second dwelling place is his principal home. 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, Section 20, 
Comment b(2), says, 
As between two homes, a person's principal horn: 
is that to which he is more closel:y related 0~l th: 
stated in other words, that which is. m~re ~e: YThi: 
center of his domestic, social and civil lif · 'lY 
will normally be the home where he and his fa~i jfi:: 
spend the greater part of their time. ~
. h · th re spacious, ~ are factors as which ome is e mo . . 5 in 
contains the bulk of the household furnis~ 
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which he has shown more interest, which home has a 
way of life more conducive to the person's tastes 
and.from whi~h,home d?es he engage more actively in 
soci':11 and.civic affa7rs, as by voting, holding 
public office, attending church, belonging to the 
local clubs, and ~he like. The person's own feelings 
towards the dwelling lace are of great im ortance. 
(emphasis added 
Although it is true that during the time that the 
plaintiff was managing the motel in Montana she clearly spent 
more time there, however, the affection was always for home in 
Ogden where she kept all of her household goods, where her family 
lived, and where she intended to return. 
states, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
IT IS A WELL SETTLED RULE THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
A CHANGE OF DOMICIL IS ON THE PERSON WHO ALLEGES IT. 
The RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, Section 19 
A domicil once established continues until it is 
superseded by a new domicil. 
The writers continued in RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICTS, 
Section 19, Comment (c), 
The burden of proof is on the party who asserts 
that a change of domicil has taken place. 
Clearly the domicil of the plaintiff was Utah until 
such time as she journeyed to Montana to manage the motel. At 
that point the defendant claims that she changed her domicil. 
We have already discussed at length some of those 
factors that indicate a change of domicil claiming unequivocally 
that the plaintiff never changed her domicil. For the trial 
court to conclude that she was a resident of Montana or domiciled 
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there, it must have been a change of domicil. The burden 1, 
upon the defendant to prove such a change of dornicil b 
Y the 
criteria heretofore cited, i.e. physical presence plus inter 
and there is not one word of evidence in the transcript to, 
that the plaintiff intended to change her dornicil. T~d~~ 
has therefore necessarily failed to sustain its burden and t: 
court erred if it concluded that a change of dornicil had om 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Allen, sustained an injury whi: 
traveling between Ogden and Dillon, Montana. The injury occ'; 
in Idaho. Unquestionably the plaintiff had a cause of acticr 
against the defendant, and the sole question was where the ac 
should be commenced. Obviously, if the action were comrnencei 
the State of Idaho after two years from the date it accrued, 
would have been barred by the Idaho statute. However, she ct 
to file her action in Utah rather than Montana, in which the 
d . ·a .1 statute of limitations at that time had not run, an inc1 en,.: 
still has not run. 
Plaintiff believes that the legislature designed 1 
78-12-45 UCA 1953, specifically for persons in the positionoi 
Mrs. Allen, remedial in nature, and should be liberally cons:: 
for her benefit. 
.J 
The statute refers to "citizenship" rather than r. 
which plaintiff feels is a significant difference implying 
to a Partl. cular state, in this case,·',, affection or endearment 
. iqr,! 
d t certain r ... It is important to note that citizenship eno es 
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privileges such as the right to vote within the state, etc. 
Plaintiff has argued throughout that her history of voting in 
utah, owning property here, maintaining her home here, intending 
to return here, are all strong indicia of her citizenship in the 
State of Utah. If, however, the courts conclude that citizenship, 
residency and domicil are all synonymous, then of course citizen-
ship may not carry the connotation of affection or allegiance or 
endearment to a particular state or country. But notwithstanding 
the primary criteria for determining residency by almost any 
standard is intent on the part of the individual. Obviously, we 
must look to their overt acts to determine if their testimony 
relative to their intent is credible and whether it ought to be 
believed and relied upon. If Mrs. Allen had sold her residence 
at 793 Cross Street, or if she had removed all of her household 
goods therefrom, or leased it out to someone who had a legal right 
to occupy the premises, we could logically conclude that if Mrs. 
Allen did in fact have an intention to return, it was nothing 
more than a "floating intention". That is not the case. She kept 
her household goods here. She continued to pay her taxes on the 
property. She allowed her daughter to live in the home and take 
care of it for her, and when she was in the Ogden area she stayed 
there, not as a guest of her daughter, but with an absolute right 
to do so because it was, in fact, her home. 
It is true that they remained in Montana longer than 
they intended to and longer than they desired to, but they always 
had a very specific intention of returning to their "home"• 
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There are other factors that · h h weig eavily in t-
matter. Mrs. Allen was born in Utah. She went to Schoo): 
She was married here. She lived here continuously 
and the 
evidence that defendant can rely upon to show a contrary 
attitude is that their automobile utilized by the plain ti:: 
her husband in Montana was registered in Montana, that the· 
income taxes on the their motel operation in Montana, that·. 
went to church in Montana, and when they gave someone such. 
independent medical examiner their address, they used the:'.·, 
address. All of these factors are matters over which Mrs.:, 
had little or no control. Registering and licensing ~e~ 
in Montana was not a question of choice to her. Paying ta1, 
in Montana was not a choice to her. But in those areas whe: 
did, in fact, have a choice, such as carrying a Utah driver' 
license, voting in Utah, owning property in Utah, she chose 
as the state of her residency and the state of her citizens:. 
If the defendant is to show that at some time sur'' 
to 19 72 the residency of Mrs. Allen changed, they have the :I 
of proving it, which they have not done. The judgment of r 
• I 
trial court should be reversed and the case remanded to tn: 
awarding of damages consistent with the evidence produced a: 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 
RICHARD RICHARDS 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 8440\: 
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I certify that I mailed two copies of Appellant's 
Brief to L. RIDD LARSON and JAMES W. GILSON, Attorneys for 
Defendant, 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this 2nd day of November, 1977. 
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